He estado leyendo un interesante artículo en The Spectator sobre la expulsión de Donald Trump de Tweeter y la libertad de expresión que supone esa decición.
Más allá de las repercusiones u opiniones de la acción llevada a cabo por la red social, en el artículo Donald Trump and the limits of free speech se desarrolla por parte Johan Norberg, autor de dicha entrada, la definición de lo que he encontrado dos conceptos realmente interesantes del concepto libertad.
Estos dos conceptos se basan tanto en la libertad positiva y como en la libertad negativa:
The negative one, based on ‘premises of inherent individual rights’, and the positive one, ‘based on Marxist principles.
Pero dichos conceptos no son nuevos, nos clarifica el periodista:
Isaiah Berlin’s essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, from 1958 is the most famous description of the distinction.
Desde donde podemos encontrar valiosa información en Wikipedia y su página: Two Concepts of Liberty.
En dicha página se describen tanto como libertad positiva y negativa:
“is involved in the answer to the question ‘What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?’ The two questions are clearly different, even though the answers to them may overlap.”
Positive liberty may be understood as self-mastery, and includes one’s having a role in choosing who governs the society which one is a part of. Berlin traced positive liberty from Aristotle’s definition of citizenship, which is historically derived from the social role of the freemen of classical Athens: it was, Berlin argued, the liberty in choosing their government granted to citizens, and extolled, most famously, by Pericles. Berlin granted that both concepts of liberty represent valid human ideals, and that both forms of liberty are necessary in any free and civilised society.
“liberty in the negative sense involves an answer to the question: ‘What is the area within which the subject—a person or group of persons—is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons’.”
For Berlin, negative liberty represents a different, and sometimes contradictory, understanding of the concept of liberty, which needs to be carefully examined. Its later proponents (such as Tocqueville, Constant, Montesquieu, John Locke, David Hume and John Stuart Mill, who accepted Chrysippus’ understanding of self-determination) insisted that constraint and discipline were the antithesis of liberty and so were (and are) less prone to confusing liberty and constraint in the manner of rationalists and the philosophical harbingers of totalitarianism. This concept of negative liberty, Berlin argued, constitutes an alternative, and sometimes even opposed, concept to positive liberty, and one often closer to the intuitive modern usage of the word. Berlin considered negative liberty one of the distinguishing concepts of modern liberalism and observed
“The fathers of liberalism–Mill and Constant–want more than this minimum: they demand a maximum degree of non-interference compatible with the minimum demands of social life. It seems unlikely that this extreme demand for liberty has ever been made by any but a small minority of highly civilized and self-conscious human beings.”
Se puede leer el ensayo en: Isaiah Berlin, “TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY,” Four Essays On Liberty, (Oxford,
England: Oxford University Press, 1969)“